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The Criminalization of the Theft of Trade Secrets:
An Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act
Nicola Searle*
Introduction
One of the most famous trade secrets in the world, the secret Coca-Cola formula, has
long been a subject of fascination. Tales of this century-long, highly maintained secret
have become part of the company’s folklore.1 However, Coca-Cola’s secrecy was
tested in 2006 when Joya Williams and her two partners attempted to sell Coke secrets
to its main rival, Pepsi, for $1.5 million.2 Pepsi turned these unmasked offenders over
to the authorities and Williams was subsequently sentenced to eight years in prison.3
The law that led to Williams’s incarceration is the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
(EEA). Amid concerns over the vulnerability of American trade secrets, the United
States enacted the EEA in 1996. Prior to the EEA, the theft of trade secrets was, by
itself, not a crime. Using data from EEA prosecutions, this essay provides institutional
detail and policy analysis of the EEA. It begins with a short history of the legislation,
presents the theoretical underpinnings for trade secrecy protection progresses to a
statistical analysis of the composition of EEA cases and concludes with a statistical
and theoretical examination of the criminalization of trade secrets.
This essay presents a law and economics assessment of how the elevation of the
theft of trade secrets from civil malfeasance to a felony affects the incentives for
both firms and potential thieves. The essay begins with a theoretical analysis of the
EEA and concludes with an empirical assessment of prosecutions under the EEA. In
comparison to penalties used in civil cases, the new incentive of a criminal deterrent
to trade secret theft introduces severe consequences, such as incarceration as a form
*Nicola Searle is Senior Knowledge Exchange Associate at the University of Abertay Dundee. B.S.
(International Economics, 2000) Georgetown University; and MSc (International Strategy and Economics,
2006) and PhD (Economics, 2010) University of St Andrews.
1. For a discussion on the Coke folklore, see Barbara Mikkelson, Have a Cloak and a Smile, SNOPES.COM,
http://www.snopes.com/cokelore/formula.asp (last updated June 4, 2011).
2. 3 Arrested in Coca-Cola Trade Secret Scheme, CNN.COM (July 5, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/05/
news/companies/coke_pepsi/.
3. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008).
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of punishment.4 Additionally, the criminalization of trade secrets plays into the property
versus liability debate.5 When confronted with a theft of trade secrets, a rm must decide
whether to seek legal recourse and, if so, whether recourse should be criminal and/or civil.6
However, the nancial damages assessed in EEA criminal cases can be compared to civil
cases, and are found to be lower.7
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996
Amid reports of the theft8 of American trade secrets by foreigners, the United States
enacted the EEA9 in 1996. The act marked a signicant change in the legal approach to
trade secrets by increasing the category of the theft of trade secrets to a felony, broadening
the denition of trade secrets and including extraterritorial jurisdiction. While most
American states had passed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),10 the EEA harmonized
trade secret law across the country. This new harmonization makes it possible to examine
trade secrets thoroughly in a consistent manner across all states.
The EEA was enacted under the presidency of Bill Clinton and coincided with a time of
economic prosperity in the United States. It was, as Carr and Gorman note,11 drafted in
a post-Cold War era during which time the United States enjoyed a relatively militarily
peaceful time. Given these circumstances, many authors12 argue the closing down of the
market for political and military spies meant these spies adapted their trade to industrial
espionage. The concept that former spies were now engaging in economic espionage
was of great interest to U.S. politicians and businesses.13 According to Fialka, a series of
incidents involving French businessmen and spy allegations in the early 1990s caught the
attention of the U.S. intelligence agencies.14 Acquisitions of American assets by Chinese
and Japanese entities alarmed American businesses.15 At the same time, the economy was
in the process of shifting to an ever more information based, digital platform which both
increased the bulk of potentially valuable information and exposed that information to the
4. Chris Carr, Jack Morton & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mouse Trap?, 8
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2000).
5. See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
6. KEITH HODKINSON & MARTIN WASIK, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE PROTECTION AND REMEDIES (1986).
7. Josh Lerner, Using Litigation to Understand Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration (Aug. 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922520.
8. See JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA (1997).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
10. Robbin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Applications of the Economic Espionage Act
and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (2003).
11. Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market Who Report Trade
Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 25-33 (2001).
12. Carr et al., supra note 4; Carr & Gorman, supra note 11; HEDEIH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND
INDUSTRIAL SPYING (2005).
13. FIALKA, supra note 8; Effron, supra note 10.
14. FIALKA, supra note 8, at 87-112.
15. Id. at 41-65.
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inherent insecurity (e.g., its easily replicable nature) of the digital world.16 These political
and economic shifts drew to public attention the potential threat of economic espionage and
the vulnerability of trade secrets to theft.
Prior to the EEA, the theft of trade secrets was dealt with primarily via civil actions
and related criminal charges.17 In two provisions, sections 1831 and 1832, the EEA
elevated economic espionage and the theft of trade secrets to a felony. Section 1831,
Economic Espionage, makes the theft of trade secrets to benet a foreign agent a criminal
act punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment and $500,000 for individuals and up to
$10 million ne for corporations. Section 1832, Theft of Trade Secrets, makes theft of,
attempted theft of, or conspiracy to steal trade secrets a crime. In this case, the individual
can be ned up to $250,000 and imprisoned for up to 10 years, while corporations are
subject to nes up to $5 million.
Two elements of the act have been controversial: the extension of the denition of trade
secrets and the potential extraterritorial application of the act. Effron (2003) notes the
EEA’s broader denition of trade secrets in comparison to the previous UTSA standard:
To the UTSA’s “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process,” the EEA adds “plans, . . . program devices, . . . designs,
prototypes, . . . techniques, . . . procedures, . . . or codes” and expressly protects
“nancial, business, scientic, technical, economic, or engineering information.18
This extension to named types of information broadens the overall denition of trade
secrets. In addition, the concept of “public” as a test for secrecy is somewhat obfuscated in
the EEA, which merely states, “from not being generally known to . . . the public”,19 which
leaves considerable room for interpretation of who the public entails. This has been a point
of debate in EEA cases.20
In addition, the act has extraterritorial applications in Section 1837, Applicability to Conduct
Outside the United States, which extends the prosecution of economic espionage and the theft
of trade secrets to specic conduct occurring outside the United States. This extraterritorial
reach21 may force companies with U.S. links to enact protection schemes for the trade secrets,
or alter their behavior in ways that they would have done prior to the EEA.22 At least one
16. Carr & Gorman, supra note 11.
17. Id.
18. Effron, supra note 10, at 1487.
19. 18 U.S.C. §1839(3)(B).
20. For an example, see the appeal documents in United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002).
21. To mitigate the controversy regarding the extraterritorial reach, the Attorney General (Janet Reno at the
time) required the rst ve years of prosecutions be subject to express approval of the ofce of the attorney
general. Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act—Reverse Engineering and Intellectual Property
Public Policy, 7 MICH TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147 (2001).
22. See Effron, supra note 10.
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case has involved conduct outside the United States. In United States v. Cartwright,23 two
of the individual defendants were U.S. citizens living abroad in Prague and receiving stolen
information to benet two foreign corporations from their U.S.-based counterpart in Maryland.
However, in cases involving foreign nationals, other countries may not be willing to extradite
suspects.24 This was the case with United States v. Okamoto25 in which Japan refused the
U.S. extradition request.26 These two cases are the only two EEA prosecutions that appear to
involve the extraterritorial application and the question of extradition.
Justications for Trade Secrecy
The theoretical underpinnings of Intellectual Property Rights develop rationales for the
creation of these property rights. Two prominent theories can be found in the writings of
John Locke (1690) and Adam Smith (1776).27 Locke provides a theoretical justication for
property rights applying the concept of labor theory of acquisition.28, 29 Locke argues that
individuals have ownership of their own labor and, when that labor is applied to remove
something out of its natural state, the result is also his property. Smith argues for property
rights as a means to avoid the tragedy of the commons.30 IP protection systems provide
a policy tool to maintain the delicate balance of the individual’s property rights and the
utilitarian perspective of social surplus.
Further justications can be found in the social contract theory of IP in which law
is a contract between the state (society) and innovators. As Denicolo and Franzoni
note, contract theory argues the goal of IP is to “promote the diffusion of innovative
knowledge.”31 Under the patent system, the individual reveals the innovation and is granted
protection from appropriation, in the form of a temporary monopoly, which then results

23. United States v. Cartwright, No. 1:07-cr-00570-WMN (D. Md., led Jan. 7, 2008), indictment available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f229900/229954.pdf.
24. NASHERI, supra note 12.
25. United States v. Okamoto, No. 1:01-cr-00210-DDD-1 (N.D. Ohio, led May 8, 2001); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets
from Cleveland Clinic Foundation (May 8, 2001), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/Okamoto_
SerizawaIndict.htm.
26. Natalie Obiko Pearson, March 29, 2004, Tokyo Rejects Extradition of Alleged Spy, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
March 29, 2004, available at http://www.economicespionage.com/tokyo_rejects_extradition_of_all.htm.
27. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Classics 1999) (1776).
28. Gary Becker labels Locke’s theory as “labor theory of acquisition.” Gary S. Becker, The Economics
of Crime, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Other authors refer to Locke’s theory as labor-deserve theory, e.g.,
Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, Sharing Content: Natural-Right Copyright and Digital Environment, in 5
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 197 (Fiona McMillan ed., 2007), or merely labor theory.
29. Texts and notes selected by Maurizio Borghi, Rationales for Patent Protection, Bocconi Intellectual
Property Transatlantic Summer Academy, June 25, 2007.
30. SMITH, supra note 27.
31. Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 365, 365 (2004).
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in higher prices and lower quantities of the good. In return, society benets from the
innovation and receives the innovative knowledge in exchange for paying higher prices.
The justication for Trade Secret protection is more problematic than that of patents
and copyrights. From the Lockean perspective, trade secrecy is compatible with labor
theory of acquisition. Robert Bone, however, notes while the Lockean deserve-deserve
theory does allow for some rights over the fruits of labor, it says nothing about the need for
secrecy.32 Furthermore, from the utilitarian perspective, trade secrecy does not necessarily
have the social surplus aspects required. As Edwin Hettinger notes, trade secrecy does not
encourage the free ow of information and can limit the labor mobility of employees.33
These difculties in justifying trade secrets highlight some of the doubts raised by legal
scholars with respect to trade secrets as a form of IP.34
However, from a practical perspective, these arguments are partially addressed by
the relatively low level of protection afforded to trade secrecy in comparison with other
intellectual property.35 In addition, like patents, trade secrecy offers incentives to innovate
and develop ideas. In response to Hettinger’s arguments, Lynn Paine argues trade secrecy
is justied on the basis that individuals should have the right to control initial disclosure of
their ideas, respect for condential relationships and that patents, by offering incentives to
disclose, implicitly recognize the right of innovators not to disclose.36
Further justication for trade secrecy can be found in the analysis of privacy law. While
privacy law focuses on privacy as it pertains to individuals, the extension of privacy
to commercial activities provides further arguments in favor of trade secrecy. Richard
Posner addresses the relationship between privacy, which he denes as “the withholding
or concealment of information,”37 and secrecy, which is included in the broader denition
of privacy. Posner argues secrecy allows the innovator to choose when to disclose
information. Posner argues privacy, and therefore secrecy, is sound in an economic sense in
the commercial context because it reduces socially wasteful efforts to protect information.
The combination of labor, utilitarian, and privacy theories provides the main
justications for Intellectual Property protection. These arguments are typically applied to
the justication of patents, but similar arguments can be made in favor of trade secrecy.
32. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justication, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241
(1998). Bone notes the Lockean argument cannot “explain two of the most basic features of trade secret law: its
requirement of secrecy, and its concern with the way information is appropriated.” Id. at 284.
33. Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989). The labor mobility
of employees can be hindered by non-compete or non-disclosure clauses in employment contracts that limit
employee’s ability to work for other employers. This also falls under the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine.
34. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008).
35. David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991); Lemley, supra note 34.
36. Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justication of Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247 (1991).
37. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231 (1983).
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Trade Secret Law Harmonization
The international harmonization of trade secrecy laws is also an issue as differing
legal approaches towards trade secrets pose problems for international business.38
In contrast to patents, trade secrecy has relatively more heterogeneous protection
internationally and may fall under a variety of legal jurisdictions (e.g., tort law,
criminal law, and contract law).39 This lack of consistency obfuscates the legal
protection of trade secrets, particularly for rms operating in multiple countries.
The public status of court proceedings can also have an impact on the protection of
trade secrets, as rms will be reluctant to seek legal recourse if court proceedings are
made public.40 Furthermore, prior user rights are not internationally harmonized.41
Given the discordance of international IP regimes, harmonization of trade secret laws
internationally could prove benecial to rms operating internationally.
The Property Liability Debate
This section introduces the property liability debate with respect to trade secrets and
applies the analytical structure of optional law.42 As noted earlier, the legal protection
of trade secrets prior to the EEA rested primarily in tort and contract law. As such,
trade secrets are an entitlement protected by liability43 as opposed to other IP, such
as patents, which are protected by property rules.44 The EEA, in the criminalization
of theft of trade secrets, continues with the protection of trade secrets under liability
rules. The economic efciency of the decision to protect entitlements through property
or liability rules is an ongoing debate and merits discussion in its context with the
EEA.
Calabresi and Melamed set up the property-liability rule.45 Consider the owner
of a land and neighbor who wishes to pollute and damage the land. If the property
entitlement lies with the owner, the neighbor can only pollute with the owner’s
permission as the owner has the right to request a court injunction. If the property
entitlement lies with the neighbor, the neighbor has the right to pollute. In these
cases, the entitlement can result in an enjoinment of the nuisance (pollution) or
does not recognize a nuisance. However, under the liability rules, the situation is

38. Bone, supra note 32; Lemley, supra note 34.
39. Bone, supra note 32; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
40. NASHERI, supra note 12.
41. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Mitch Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
42. Optional law takes real options analysis and applies it to law.
43. Liability rules protect entitlements by compensating the entitlement holder in the event of a nonconsensual taking. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
44. Property rules protect the holder of the entitlement by deterring non-consensual takings. Id.
45. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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different. Assuming entitlement lies with the owner, the neighbor can pollute but must
compensate the owner.46 In this case, the rules allow for damages47 and the nuisance to
continue.
Calabresi and Melamed argue entitlements promote economic efciency in that they
minimize the administrative costs of enforcement, promote pareto optimality and can
address society’s distributional goals. Furthermore, the authors argue liability rules are
enacted when transactions costs are too high. This argument, as in Ayres, has become
standard delineating theory of the decision to use property or liability rules.48 A similar
argument, also in Ayres, is the “Posnerian theory” which argues that where transactions
costs are not too high, property rules are favored as they “force” parties to negotiate.49
When applied to IP, the use of property rights should reduce transactions costs. As
Merges argues, “property rules can and do work effectively in many situations involving
IPRs. This is so because, in the presence of high transaction costs, industry participants have
an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR exchange.”50 This argument
can justify the property protection of patents. However, Blair and Cotter argue trade secrets
should have different protection than patents due to the unique characteristics of trade
secrets including the lack of disclosure and the right of competitors’ to reverse engineer.51
Furthermore, the application of the property–liability debate when applied to the
EEA is not straightforward because the use of a property rule to protect trade secrets is
problematic. The conversion of the trade secrecy entitlement into a property rule would
imply the use of a trade secret could be enjoined. In practice, while the court could issue
injunctions with respect to stolen trade secrets, the theft itself can destroy the secrecy of
the trade secret itself. The value of the entitlement is destroyed by the theft. Furthermore,
Blair and Cotter acknowledge “a trade secret owner’s rights are not valid against the
world, but rather only against persons who have acquired the secret in certain ways or
who stand in a condential relationship to the owner.”52 Epstein concludes the case for
the treatment of trade secrets as property from a legal perspective “remains a mess.”53
46. Calabresi and Melamed also discuss the case in which, under the liability rule, the entitlement lies with
the neighbor, but note this is not common. Id. at 1120.
47. Liability rules in criminal sanctions serve to approximate the value (damages) of the entitlement to its
owner. Further discussion of criminal prosecution under the property law can be found in Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
48. See AYRES, supra note 43, at 143.
49. Id.
50. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655
(1994).
51. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability Rules and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799 (2002).
52. Id. at 811 n.31.
53. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 57, 72 (2004).
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Hence, the theoretical application of property rules to the entitlement of trade secrets does
not t the Calabresi and Melamed denition of property rules. Thus, the use of a variant of
the liability under the EEA is in line with the unique characteristics of trade secrets, which,
as discussed earlier, do not involve the public disclosure associated with patents.
Options Analysis of the Law
Ayres applies the real options theory of economics to that of law to argue property rules
are a special case of liability rules. Using the put/call framework of options theory, Ayres
describes liability rules as a call option in which the entitlement is taken non-consensually
and the owner is paid damages.54 He describes property rules as having a call option
(damages) so high it deters non-consensual taking. In this sense, Ayres argues, “property
rules are liability rules with an exercise price so high that the option is (almost) never
taken.”55
Ayres notes the legal trend in the U.S. is the increasing “propertization of intellectual
entitlements”56 in the form of IP. However, despite the trend to strengthening the property
status of IP, the options theory framework of Ayres argues the property protection for IP is
a variant of the liability rule.
In his analysis of the debate between property and liability rules, he criticizes Calabresi
and Melamed’s argument that liability rules are preferred when transactions costs are
high. As Ayres argues, the transactions cost argument neglects to address the fact that
bargaining can happen in the shadow of liability and property rules. Additionally, Ayres
argues options theory can show liability rules can dominate property rules in economic
efciency terms.
However, Ayres does not solve the liability versus property rules debate. As he notes,
“The stark truth is that despite the empirical prevalence of property (and indeed the
headlong rush toward the extreme propertization of intellectual property), no one has to
date produced a satisfying algebraic model in which property rules dominate liability
rules.”57 Thus, in the liability–property rule debate, the property status of other IP may
raise more questions than it does answers.
Overall, the examination of the property–liability rule debate in the context of the
EEA further underscores the structural differences between trade secrets and patents and
furthers the analysis of the criminal treatment of the theft of trade secrets.

54. This application of options theory is in line with Scotchmer’s observation of the circular relationship
between damages and royalty rates in which the potential infringer can seek to negotiate royalty rates or
exercise a call option in the form of infringement and the subsequent payment of damages. See SUZANNE
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2005).
55. AYRES, supra note 43, at 5.
56. Id. at 185.
57. Id. at 199.
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Law and Economics Analysis of Tort and Criminal Law
Further analysis of the decision to convert the theft of trade secrets into a felony can be
found in the law and economics literature. Dnes notes criminalization of activity differs from
civil action on three points: the standard of proof, mens rea (intent) and the element of public
harm (i.e. the public is harmed by such actions).58 Furthermore, Dnes argues, “in tort, we
tend to know when the accident or nuisance has occurred” while in criminal action, we may
not. Thus, a prime role of the punishment in criminal cases is as a deterrent effect. This has
important implications for the economic efciency of the criminalization of trade secrets.
When applied to the theft of trade secrets, many of Dnes’ elements of criminal law are
met.59 Certainly, the standard of proof in EEA cases should be higher than parallel civil
actions. However, the issue of intent may not be as straightforward. For this element to
be met, the defendant would have to know that the trade secret they were stealing was,
in fact, a protected trade secret. Furthermore, it may be, as in the case of DirecTV,60 the
defendant intended to do harm but without a nancial motive. Given the EEA is primarily
concerned with the economic effects of trade secret theft, this lack of nancial benet
raises concerns about the efciency of using criminal actions to prosecute a previously
civil nuisance.
The element of public harm in EEA cases is indirect. As trade secrets are privately held
information, then the individual cases of theft are, by denition, private. However, the
general deterrence effect of the EEA criminal sanctions should serve to benet privately held
information in general. If criminals are deterred by the EEA, then the owners of trade secrets
can incur less wasteful avoidance expenditures to protect trade secrets. Thus, the public
indirectly benets from a more secure IP environment. Dnes puts this succinctly: “sufcient
penalties create deterrence, which removes the need for wasteful avoidance by potential
victims.”61 In deterring the theft of trade secrets, a wasteful crime that benets the few, in
that costs incurred by the many owners of trade secrets in the form of wasteful avoidance are
reduced. Thus, the deterrence effects of the EEA increases economic efciency by decreasing
the costs associated with protecting trade secrets.
However, Dnes is critical of the use of criminal law to protect torts he deems that in some
cases it is “staggeringly inappropriate.”62 He cites the example of the BBC license fee in the
UK. The possession of a television without a license is subject to criminal sanctions in the
form of nes. In this case, Dnes concludes, “the state is using its coercive power simply to
reduce the cost of pursuing those taking BBC services, offered to all, and subsequently failing
58. Anthony Dnes, Criminal Law and Torts, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009).
59. Id.
60. United States v. Serebryany, No. 2:03-cr-00042-LGB (C.D. Cal., led Jan. 16, 2003).
61. Dnes, supra note 58, at 112 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW (1987)).
62. Id. at 120.
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to pay for them.”63 However, this example differs from the EEA in that, unlike the BBC
monitoring of licenses, in which the BBC has a legal right to issue and monitor licenses,64 the
reporting of EEA thefts is a voluntary action on the part of the victim. Nonetheless, both cases
involve criminal sanctions to support the business models of corporations.
Dnes further examines the delineation of criminal and tort law, and the use of criminal law
in place of civil law, in a pollution example. In this case, the use of criminal law allows the
coercive power of the state to “encourage desirable behavior.”65 In this case, under tort law,
a polluter will prefer to pay nes when the marginal cost of abatement of pollution is higher
than that of the ne. However, Dnes argues criminal nes are equivalent to a strict-liability
tort66 and nes are paid on all pollution above the minimal level. As Dnes points out, nes are
always paid under the criminal law, whether or not the polluter abates. This, as Dnes argues,
more efciently discourages pollution.
An extension of this pollution example can be found in the EEA. The criminal prosecution
of trade secrets could interact with the reverse engineering exception to trade secrecy. That
is, the costs of reverse engineering could be considered abatement costs. Where reverse
engineering is more expensive than nes, rms will choose to steal. In tort and contract
law, the damages calculation (ne) can function as a compulsory license.67 Under criminal
action, theft is subject to nes and/or incarceration. When reverse engineering is cheaper
than nes, rms will reverse engineer. By increasing the punishment associated with theft,
the EEA indirectly encourages reverse engineering. Samuelson and Scotchmer argue
reverse engineering is important to innovation and competition and, thus, the EEA can be
an important policy tool with respect to reverse engineering.68 Hence, the EEA promotes
economic efciency by encouraging innovation, which is seen as a social benet.
However, a normative conclusion on the decision to criminalize the theft of trade secrets
is beyond the scope of this essay. While the EEA should improve economic efciency in the
reduction of avoidance costs and the benets from innovation, the overall optimality of the
criminalization of the theft of trade secrets is not certain. The analysis here suggest the EEA
increases economic efciency by decreasing costs via improved deterrence and increasing
63. Id.
64. For details, see TV Licensing—FOI: Legal framework, TVLICENSING.CO.UK, http://www.tvlicensing.co.uk/
about/foi-legal-framework-AB16/
65. Dnes, supra note 58, at 121.
66. Liability which is independent of culpability.
67. As Dan Burk notes, “Courts have in a very few instances denied injunctive relief to patent holders in favor
of monetary damages, effectively creating a compulsory license for that patent, at a royalty determined by the
court.” Dan L. Burk, Critical Analysis of Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Molecular Futures: Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Cathedral, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS,
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1359216.
68. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 39. However, as Samuelson and Scotchmer point out, the legal status
of reverse engineering under the EEA is unclear. See id.
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social benets by encouraging innovation. Further empirical investigations on the effects of
the EEA should shed more light on this fact. Whether the EEA’s criminalization of the theft of
trade secrets is entirely inappropriate remains to be seen.
Empirical Analysis of the EEA
To move from theoretical analysis to the empirical investigations of the EEA, we turn
to the EEA prosecution data. During the period covered by this essay (1996-2008), there
were 147 defendants in 95 cases involving the EEA. For this research, these cases have
been identied using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.
Once identied, each case was then investigated via docket reports, court documents,
and online media coverage. Further information was gathered from academic essays
related to the EEA.69 Depending on the court, ofcial documents are only available from
more recent cases; in some courts, the documents are only available for cases since
2004. For a minority of cases, little to no information on the victim company and stolen
information was available. The information gathered in this prosecution data represents
a unique look into the use of trade secrets, their theft, and the policy choices available
to governments.
Data Challenges
The use of prosecution data faces a number of challenges and the EEA data are
no exception. The primary obstacle is that of adverse selection. Prosecutors select
cases based on the severity of the crime and the likelihood of successful prosecution.
Prosecutors are also more likely to seek prosecution in cases where the evidence is
strong and a conviction is likely as the burden of proof in criminal cases has a “tougher
criterion than in one used in civil disputes.”70 Furthermore, victims must rst report the
alleged crime to the FBI via an ofcial document reporting the offense.71 As Nasheri
notes, “Probably the greatest reason why trade secret theft is not prosecuted more often is
the failure of victim companies to report such thefts to government authorities.”72
The cumulative effect of these challenges to the use of prosecution data is that
conclusions arising from the data are tempered by the inherent sample bias. Despite
this, it is important to remember that, given the nature of trade secrets, very little
empirical data are available on their use. Economists have long used evidence from
litigation to investigate the use of patents and their economic importance.73 The use of
69. Particularly Effron, supra note 10; Carr et al., supra note 4 ; Carr & Gorman, supra note 11; Marc J.
Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Calculating Loss Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 323 (2000); NASHERI, supra note 12.
70. Dnes, supra note 58; ANTHONY W. DNES, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW (1996); see also ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2004).
71. Via their local FBI ofce, reporting form is “Checklist for Reporting Theft of Trade Secret Offense”,
available from http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/reportingchecklist-ts.pdf
72. NASHERI, supra note 12, at 52
73. E.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 54.
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patent litigation evidence can be found in Lanjouw and Schankerman,74 Schankerman and
Scotchmer,75 and Jaffe and Lerner.76 As such, the EEA prosecution data are a legitimate means
of analysis and offer a glimpse into the unseen world of trade secrets. The empirical analysis
of EEA data developed throughout this essay furthers the understanding of the strategic use of
trade secrets as a means of protecting innovation and builds on the similar existing litigation
studies in patents. This essay joins Zwillinger and Genetski,77 Lerner78 and Almeling et al.79 in
the use of court data to understand trade secrets.
Composition of Defendants, Victims and Trade Secrets in EEA Cases
Defendants
From its inception in 1996 through to 2008, 147 defendants were charged under the EEA.
Given the economic espionage concerns that surrounded the birth of the EEA, the composition
of the defendants themselves provides insight into the relevance of the drafters’ concerns.
The data indicate the threat of theft is not external but predominately internal. As shown in
the last row of Table 1, the EEA data demonstrate 76% of the defendants are insiders, 17% are
outsiders and 7% have an unknown relationship. An “insider” is dened as a current or former
employee, which includes permanent and temporary employees and consultants or workers
performing contracted-out work (for a third party company). In contrast, only 25 defendants
were classied as outsiders, which include competitors, non-employees, or other roles that do
not provide legitimate access.
While the fact insiders are disproportionately responsible for theft in EEA cases should
come as no surprise, as stated in Almeling et al.,80 it highlights the vulnerability trade secrets
face when much of their protection is based on nondisclosure agreements. It also indicates
some of the presumptions which led to the signing of the EEA, as in Carr et al. ,81 were
concentrated misguidedly on outside threats, when the focus should have been on the internal
threat to trade secrets.
74. See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 J. Law & ECON. 45 (2004); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of
Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, NATL. BURAEU ECON.
RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 7345 (1999); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Stylized Facts of Patent
Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership, NATL. BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 6297 (1997).
75. Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual Property,
32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001).
76. JOSH LERNER & ADAM B. JAFFE, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
77. Supra note 69.
78. Supra note 7.
79. David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Saponznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Weader, A
Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2010).
80. Id.
81. See Carr et al., supra note 4.
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Table 1: Characteristics of EEA Defendants
CharacterisƟcs of Defendants*
NaƟonality
Foreign
NaƟonal**
Total

Total
Count
%
32
22%
115
78%
147

Outsider
7
18
25

RelaƟonship to the VicƟm
%
Insider
%
Unknown
5%
25
17%
12%
86
59%
11
17%
111
76%
11

%
7%
7%

Source: EEA database on file with author.
* Reports on 136 of 147 defendants; insufficient information available for the missing 11
observations.
**If nationality unknown, defendant assumed to be U.S. national

The nationality of the defendants presents another test to the original presumptions
of the EEA. As seen in the second column of Table 1, only 22% of the defendants
were foreign nationals. Of the 32 foreigners charged with EEA violations, only one
was convicted under § 1831 (Economic Espionage). Given the concern with economic
espionage at the drafting of the EEA, these numbers suggest either economic
espionage is less prevalent than trade secret theft, or its detection is more difficult.
Industrial Sectors of Victims
The EEA data also provide a look into the industries using trade secrets. The
trade secret theft victim companies were classified by their Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code. In the majority (57%) of cases, the victim company
operated in the manufacturing sectors. Of those in manufacturing, the largest groups
include those in semiconductor manufacturing and manufacturers with software
applications. The second largest sector is the service industry (17% of cases) and
the remaining cases are scattered throughout other sectors. In line with Cohen et
al. (2000),82 the predominance of the manufacturing sector in EEA cases suggests
protection of trade secrets from theft is particularly important to this sector.
Manufacturing has long had patents available as a robust form of protection.83 That
the manufacturing sector, a sector that has both patent and copyright protection
available, should be so active in trade secrets, emphasizes the importance of trade
secrecy protection.
82. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Condition and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NATL. BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 7552 (2000).
83. Several studies examine the use of patents in manufacturing sectors, including Anthony Arundel &
Isabelle Kabla, What Percentage of Innovations Are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms, 27
RESEARCH POLICY 127 (1998), and F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of
Patented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1965).
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Subject Matter of Stolen Trade Secrets
Trade secrecy protection has a large scope. It encompasses condential information
including source code; test data; strategic business information; and potentially patentable
subject matters. In the EEA cases, as seen in Table 2 column 2, only 39% of the stolen
trade secrets are deemed potentially patentable (meaning their subject matter is not
excluded from patents; inventive step was not judged). 11% of stolen trade secrets had
no descriptive information publicly available. 29% had only trade secrecy as a form of
IP protection, which means this condential information is particularly vulnerable and its
theft particularly damaging. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the characteristics of
these stolen trade secrets.
Table 2: EEA Trade Secrets
CharacterisƟcs of Stolen Trade Secrets: EEA Cases From 1996-2008
Type
Count
%
PotenƟally patentable

38

39%

Not patentable

47

49%

Protected by other IP

19

20%

Not protected

28

29%

UnidenƟed

9

11%

Total

95
Source: EEA database on le with author.

It is important to emphasize these classications are based on limited information
regarding the nature of the stolen trade secrets. Given the requirements for patent
protection, Table 2 likely represents an overestimation of the trade secrets that are
potentially patentable. That these trade secret owners chose not to use those alternate
protections is proof further of the importance of trade secret protection for protecting
innovations.
The Criminalization of the theft of Trade Secrets
The Impact on Victims
In EEA cases, all of the victims have been corporations and not individuals. The
decision of these rms to detect, investigate, report and proceed with criminal prosecution
involves a different weighing of costs and benets than is necessary in civil cases.
Benets to the Victim Firm
From a resource perspective, a decision to seek a criminal prosecution involves a
number of benets to the victim rm. Unlike civil cases, the defendant in criminal cases
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has a right to a speedy trial.84 As a result, the victim rm potentially saves time and money
avoiding a lengthy and resource-absorbing court case, as in Nasheri.85 Additionally,
unlike civil cases, the cost of criminal prosecution is borne by the government and not the
victim.
Further benets of choosing criminal prosecution of trade secrets theft include the
ability to prosecute judgment-proof defendants, a stronger sense of retribution and a
potentially stronger enforcement message. As Carr et al. note,86 defendants without
nancial resources can commit trade secrecy theft, a civil suit resulting in damages can
be a moot point as the judgment proof defendant is unable to pay. The criminal system
avoids this with the option of incarceration as a form of punishment.87 Incarceration may
have a stronger sense of retribution for trade secret victims as trade secret thieves are
removed from the workplace and society at large.88 This incarceration also sends a strong
enforcement message and decreases the expected benets of theft.
Costs for the Victim Firm
Criminal prosecutions of defendants entail potential costs for the trade secret owner.
A conspicuous resource cost associated with criminal prosecutions in EEA cases is
lower nancial damages awarded to the victim. However, a criminal action against the
defendant does not preclude a parallel civil action. Victims can choose to seek both a
criminal and a civil action89 and, thereby, mitigate the lower damages observed in criminal
cases.
Trade secret cases also run the risk of exposing the secret to the public gaze; however,
the EEA does include condentiality requirements.90 The trade secret becomes vulnerable
to exposure during court cases, which, by denition, will negate its secrecy, as discussed
in Lowry.91 As Lerner notes,92 a cost to the victim of taking legal steps following the
misappropriation of a trade secret is the potential for the loss of trade secrecy. Competitors
may be able to glean strategic information from the court documents even if the trade
84. See, e.g., David Oblon, Gerald J. Mossinghoff & J. Derek Mason, The Economic Espionage Act: Federal
Protection for Corporate Trade Secrets, OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. (March
1999), http://www.oblon.com/publications/economic-espionage-act-federal-protection-corporate-tradesecrets.
85. See NASHERI, supra note 12.
86. Supra note 4.
87. E.g., Dnes, supra note 58.
88. E.g., DNES, supra note 70.
89. Two examples in which the victim enacted a parallel civil suit in addition to the criminal charges are United
States v. Kern, No. 2:99-cr-00015-DFL-1 (E.D. Cal., led Jan. 21, 1999) , and United States v. Four Pillars, No.
1:97-cr-00288-PCE-3 (N.D. Ohio, led Oct. 1, 1997).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (“Orders to preserve condentiality”).
91. Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests,
40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988).
92. Lerner, supra note 7.

IP THEORY

Volume 2: Issue 2

47

secrets are not revealed. Inevitably, a court case will increase the number of Cozzi’s
“hints,”93 and the availability of what Nasheri calls Competitive Intelligence,94 by
increasing the number of public documents related to innovative activities.
From a relationship perspective, the cost of choosing a criminal prosecution includes
reputational and control costs. As with civil cases, the revelation a company has been
the victim of a trade secrets theft can damage its reputation. The market may view the
theft as evidence of lax security standards or future potential liability, as evidenced in
Carr and Gorman.95 Nasheri reports on a survey where nearly one half of respondents
would not report a theft to anyone outside the company.96 However, criminal charges
are likely to have particularly adverse effects on a rm’s relationship and reputation
with its employees. As the EEA data demonstrate, the majority of defendants are
insiders and employees may object to the criminal prosecution of one of their
colleagues. Increased distrust can change company culture and lower social capital
within a rm. Indeed, one critique of the functional consequences of the EEA is that it
unfairly restricts labor mobility, as in Nasheri.97
In addition, criminal prosecution requires the rm relinquish control over the
action to the government.98 While victims cooperate with the authorities, the FBI is
in charge of the investigation and federal prosecutors will make important decisions
related to the case. This loss of control presents a risk not found in civil cases where
the plaintiff has signicant control over the course of the case. Hence, the decision to
seek criminal action involves a number of nancial and other costs not associated with
civil actions.99 At the same time, the benets may make a criminal action worthwhile.
The rms in the EEA cases, by denition, weighed these costs and benets ex-ante and
proceeded with reporting the crime.
Criminalization and Detection
In order to have an accurate picture of the evidence found in the EEA prosecutions,
it is essential to examine the external effects created by the advent of criminal
prosecutions of trade secrecy theft. The EEA offers rms a means of seeking criminal,
in addition to the existing civil, action against trade secret thefts. It also affects the
behavior of employees and increases the potential punishment associated with theft.

93. Guido Cozzi, “Inventing or Spying” Implications for Growth, 6 J. ECON. GROWTH 55 (2001), describes
the “hints” associated with innovative activity that alert would-be spies to the existence of such activity.
94. Nasheri denes Competitive Intelligence as “a systematic and ethical program for gathering, analyzing
and managing information that can affect a company’s plans, decisions and operations.” NASHERI, supra note
12, at 73.
95. Carr & Gorman, supra note 11.
96. NASHERI, supra note 12, at 59.
97. NASHERI, supra note 12.
98. Carr & Gorman, supra note 11; see also Oblon et al., supra note 84.
99. Carr & Gorman, supra note 11.
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Comparison to Civil Actions
Lerner investigates trade secret litigation for insights into trade secrets and compares
this data to similar data on patent litigation.100 He notes, “In those cases where the damages
were determined, they averaged $1.5 million in 2004 dollars. This is less than one-third
the mean level of damages in the patent cases examined by Moore [2000].”101 In the
EEA cases, which do not exclude the possibility of parallel civil cases, defendants are
subject to nes, forfeitures and restitution. The victim can benet from restitution but
does not necessarily receive the benets of nes and forfeitures. The median restitution
was $193,043, which is just over one tenth of the damages in Lerner’s cases. The average
restitution of $1.5 million resembles Lerner’s average more closely but has an upward bias
due to a number of high awards as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: EEA Fines, Forfeitures and Restitutions
EEA Fines, Forfeitures and ResƟtuƟons, 1996-2008

# of defendants (%)

Fine

Forfeiture

ResƟtuƟon

35 (24%)

1 (1%)

32 (22%)

63 (43%) defendants were subject to ne, forfeiture and/or resƟtuƟon
Mean

$74,000

$60,000

$1,474,000

Standard DeviaƟon

$338,000

-

$2,564,000

Minimum

$500

$60,000

$500

Maximum

$2,000,000

$60,000

$7,655,155

Source: EEA database on le with author.

An obvious difference from civil cases is the incarceration penalties associated with
criminal cases, which are absent in civil cases. The EEA data have a conviction rate of
69% on at least one count (includes plea bargains). This compares to an estimated 90%
conviction rate in federal court102 of all federal cases that go to trial. In EEA cases, as in
Table 4, 61% of all defendants were sentenced to some form of incarceration, house arrest,

100. Lerner, supra note 7.
101. Id. at 13 (citing Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000)).
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, at II-18 (2012) (reporting 93% of
criminal cases as “favorably resolved”), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2011/section2.pdf.
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probation or supervised release. 61% of defendants were sentenced to probation, which
averaged 33 months. Only 37% of defendants were incarcerated for an average of 22
months. However, as the conviction rate of EEA cases is 69%, this data indicate 88% of
those convicted in EEA cases receive some form of incarceration, house arrest, supervised
release or probation. When removing the ve defendants classied as corporations,
virtually all individuals convicted in EEA cases receive incarceration and/or probation
sentences.
Table 4: EEA Incarceration and Probation
EEA IncarceraƟon and ProbaƟon, 1996-2008
IncarceraƟon and
ProbaƟon and Supervised Release
House Arrest
# of defendants (%)

55 (37%)

89 (61%)

90 (61%) defendants were subject to some form of incarceraƟon and probaƟon
Mean (in months)

22

33

Standard DeviaƟon

21.5

14.0

2

6

96

60

Minimum
Maximum

Source: EEA database on le with author.

Further work remains to be done on the empirical comparison of EEA criminal cases
to trade secret civil cases. This work should provide insight into the policy differences
between criminal and civil cases, the effects of the escalation of trade secrets to a felony
and the inuence on rms’ behavior.
This section presented an empirical analysis of EEA prosecutions. The data challenges
assumptions made in the drafting the EEA including the evidence that insiders and U.S.
nationals are responsible for most alleged thefts. Furthermore, the data suggests the
manufacturing sectors are particularly dependent on trade secrets and many of the secrets
in question were reliant on trade secrecy. Finally, the data illustrates some differences
between civil and criminal approaches to trade secrecy theft.
Conclusion
The EEA marked a change in the U.S. approach to trade secret theft and the threat of
economic espionage. It also offered researchers an unprecedented opportunity to gain
insight into the use of trade secrets by US rms, the composition of victims, the content
of trade secrets and the composition and motivation of defendants. While the data have
some disadvantages, it provides a hitherto unavailable insight into the world of trade
secrets.

50

IP THEORY

Volume 2: Issue 2

The data collected for this essay, 147 defendants in 95 cases of the EEA since its
inception in 1996 until 2008, demonstrate that some of the original concerns of the drafters
of the EEA were misguided. Insiders present the largest threat to trade secrets and are
responsible for the vast majority of thefts. Non-nationals, the group whom the drafters
of the EEA initially regarded as suspects, emerge as less of a concern, or at least a less
detected problem than originally anticipated. The industry reporting the most thefts is the
manufacturing sector, which suggests trade secrets are of particular strategic importance
to these rms and their enforcement is a priority. Finally, the nature of the trade secrets in
EEA cases reveals a mere 39% of them could be patented. Even with this liberal estimate,
the choice of trade secrecy by rms indicates the rms view trade secrets as an important
strategic IP tool and these secrets are particularly vulnerable to outright theft or other forms
of misappropriation.
The efciency of criminalization of the theft of trade secrets remains to be tested. As
Dnes notes, the use of criminal law for tort-like actions can be appropriate. He notes
that, “Broadly, the emphasis is on the nature of criminal intent, and the manner in which
widespread impacts may have very high values attached to them.”103 As more cases are
prosecuted under the EEA, a clearer picture of the use of criminal law in place of tort or
contract law with respect to trade secrets should emerge.

103. Dnes, supra note 58, at 123.
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